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IN THE S!JPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

11USTIN HOBBS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 19019

THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, and STATE OF
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action commenced by Plaintiff against Defendants
State of Utah, Department of Transportation and Denver & Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company for injuries sustained in a
truck-train accident which occurred in Price, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the conclusion of a two-day trial, the Honorable Dennis
Frederick, sitting without a jury, found in favor of both
defendants and entered a no cause of action against Plaintiff.
The court concluded that the actions of Plaintiff were the
sole proximate cause of the accident and that neither defendant
Rio Grande Railroad nor defendant State of Utah, Department of
Transportation were negligent.

(R.

381-387;

396).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Department of Transportation seeks affirmance of ltc
judgment in its favor.
STATEMU;T
Because this Court,

Cl!'

FACTS

in reviewing contentions of Plaintif'.,

must do so in a light most favorable to the lower court's
findings and because the findings will not be disturbed by
this Court if they are supported by substantial evidence,
respondent State of Utah, Department of Transportation (hereinafter "D.O.T. ")

shall restate the Findings of Fact made by

the lower court with appropriate record references.

In additior.

the Department would incorporate and adopt the "Statement of
Facts" contained in the Brief of defendant Denver & Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company (hereinafter "Railroad").
The following Findings of Fact were made by the lower cour._
1.

At about 10:00 p.m. on April 23, 1979, while drivino

a coal-hauling tractor-trailer truck in connection with his
employment, Plaintiff was involved in a collision with one of
the Railroad's trains at the Railroad's crossing located
between 2nd and 3rd South on 1st East in Price, Utah.

(Tr. 46!,

2.

The 1st East crossing is composed of five sets of

tracks.

The northernmost of these tracks is the active or

"mainline" track.
occurred.

It was on this track that the collision

(Tr. 141).

The tracks approach 1st East from a

slightly east-southeasterly di rec ti on.

(Tr. 589).

The mainli

track is straight for more than three-quarters of a mile to tlie
-2-

east of the 1st East crossing.
3.
l:'r

l

(Tr. 62, 589).

The Railroad's tracks also cross Carbon Avenue in

ce.

(Ex. P-10).

On the day of the accident, the Carbon

crossing was closed because of repair work being performed there at the direction of the D.O.T.

(Tr. 480-485).

The D.O.T. detoured traffic from Carbon Avenue to 1st East
to permit Railroad and D.O.T. crews to complete the work,
which was to take about three to five days.
4.

(Tr. 202).

The D.O.T. made a decision to detour traffic from

Carbon Avenue to 1st East.

(Tr. 219).

The decision was made

after a meeting called by the D.O.T. on April 6, 1979, attended
by representatives of the D.O.T., the Railroad, and Price City.
(Tr. 190, 260, 273; Defendants' Ex. 29).

At the meeting, it

was determined that it would be impractical to permit traffic
to continue across the Carbon Avenue crossing during the construction.

(Tr. 192-193).

Another alternative considered at

the meeting was the traffic be diverted to 1st West.
248).

(Tr. 232,

However, the D.O.T. decided to detour traffic to 1st

East for several reasons, including, but not limited to, the
following:
(a)

There was less existing traffic on 1st East

than on 1st West;
(b)

The housing and population of children were

less dense on 1st East;
(c)

The turns along the 1st East detour route

were easier to negotiate, particularly for large trucks;
and
-3-

(d)

The 1st East crossinc; wac; 111 bc·ttcr cond1t io 1.

and could Jn)r£' eas1l\

including the 10' '1""

1,11t' cJdd1tional

aC1'(_•r:1,>,i-1iL'

r-c•a l

t

1 1t1'f.•

tratf1r,

231-"

(T1.

262' 286-289).
The chosen detour diverted traffic traveling northbound on
Carbon Avenue right

(east) on Jrd South, left

East across the tracks to 1st South, left
then right
5.

(north) on Carbon Avenue.

(north) on 1st

(west) on 1st South,

(Defendants' Ex.

26).

Before the construction began, the warning signals at

the 1st East crossing consisted of white "crossbuck" signs
that had been there for many years.

(Plaintiff's Ex.

5).

The D.O.T. installed additional yellow railroad warning signs
(Ex.

before the detour was imposed.

30) .

The Rai 1 road imposed

a "slow" order during the construction, requiring its trains tc
reduce their speed from 40 mph to 30 mph from milepost 619.0 to
619.5 during the period of the construction.
369) .

(Tr. 233,

306,

Milepost 619.0 was located about 100 feet east of the

1st East crossing, and milepost 619.5 was located one-half
mile west of milepost 619. 0.
6.

(Tr. 564).

The train crew in the lead engine on the night of the

accident consisted of the engineer

(Martin Gasner) , the head

brakeman (Gerald Leonard), and the road foreman of equipment
(James Harvey) .

(Tr.

364,

370,

399).

Mr. Harvey's duties

included the supervision and evaluation of the Railroad's
crews, and he was seated in the lead engine on the night of
the accident for the purpose, among others, of observing and
evaluating the crew's performance.

-4-

(Tr. 420, 560).

7.
dc'Cldent,
t rum

As the train approached Price on the night of the
the train engineer reduced the speed of the train

a['S,rox1mately 60 mph to 40 mph or less in accordance with

the applicable Price City ordinance.

(Tr. 404, 564).

The train

engineer further reduced the speed of the train to 30 mph or
less at milepost 619.0 in accordance with the Railroad's
slow order.
8.
mile

(Tr. 405, 433, 564).

As the Railroad's train approached to within a quarter

of the 1st East crossing, its locomotive bell was ringing,

the fixed and oscillating headlights on the front of its locomotive were burning, and the train engineer sounded the standard
whistle signal, composed of two long blasts followed by one
short blast and one long blast.

(Tr. 121, 151, 406, 414-415,

417, 436-438, 492).
9.

On the night of the accident, Plaintiff drove north on

Carbon Avenue, then followed the detour route that led him east
on 3rd South, then north on 1st East.

(Tr. 483-485).

Plaintiff

knew that the northernmost track was the mainline track and he
was acquainted with the 1st East crossing because he crossed it
traveling south earlier on the day of the accident.

(Tr. 480).

Furthermore, Plaintiff has crossed the Carbon Avenue crossing
frequently during the six years he had worked for his employer
before the accident.
10.

(Tr. 510, 523).

As Plaintiff approached the 1st East crossing, he

slowed his truck to approximately 3 to 5 mph,

(Tr. 123) but

failed to come to a complete stop at any point before or on the
crossing.

(Tr. 485, 514).

Plaintiff had a clear view of the
-5-

approaching train for at least the li:ist 110 feet lJc·fore he·
reached the mainline track,
his view o f

the l c J d

C' n y

i

11 c

fc,r

t
h'

a :-:

i_J I 1

t r

boxcar parked approx1mcitel\' 1•10 feet
a storage track.

(Tr.

70,

53,

341,

After passing that obstruction,

u(

"
t

''cry brief fJer1oci
c d b ':' a s t

cJ.

t

i

o 11. 1 1

rasl ,,f the cross1n
G03,

Plaintiff's Ex.

61

Plaintift had a clear view o!

the approaching train for more than ten seconds before he
reached the mainline track and with ample time to bring his
truck to a stop.

(Tr. 43-44,

63,

516,

585,

603-614).

Plain-

tiff proceeded across the crossing at approximately 3 to 5
mph and either failed to look or listen for the train or faile2
to heed what he saw or heard as the train approached.
486,

522,

(Tr. 6G,

488,

514,

569).

11.

James Harvey, who was sitting in the left front seat

of the train engine cab, saw Plaintiff's truck approaching the
crossing but assumed that, because the truck was deceleratinq
and approaching the crossing so slowly, Plaintiff intended to
stop.

(Tr. 566).

Gerald Leonard, seated behind Mr. Harvey,

also saw Plaintiff's truck approaching the mainline track.

Whe:

Mr. Harvey and Mr. Leonard realized that the truck was not go1r.:
to stop before the mainline track, they simultaneously warned
Martin Gasner.

(Tr.

432,

567).

At that time,

not be stopped short of the crossing.

(Tr.

the train could

406).

Mr. Gasner

saw the truck and immediately applied the train's emergency
brakes.

(Tr. 422-428,

577,

582).

The Findings of the lower court are contained at page 381387 of the record and is also an appendix to the Brief of Ap1*l

-6-

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY FOUND
SllbSTM:TIAL EVIDENCE THAT D.O.T.
WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN THE SELECTION
OY THE lST EAST CROSSING.
It is difficult to determine from Appellant's Brief the
exact basis of his appellate claims against defendant D.O.T.
It is assumed that since the only role D.O.T. had in this
accident was the selection of the 1st East crossing as a
detour for Carbon Avenue, that this selection is the sole basis
of Appellant's claim now before this Court.

(See Appellant's

Brief, p. 13-14).
The statement of Plaintiff is incorrect that D.O.T. was
involved with "repair work being conducted at the intersection
where the accident occurred."

(Appellant's Brief, p. 13).

At the time of the accident the only repair work being performed
by D.O.T. was at Carbon Avenue--not 1st East.

It is clear that

D.O.T. did not operate the railroad engine which was involved
in the accident nor was it responsible for any actions or
omissions of the Railroad.
The claims of Appellant against D.O.T .therefore, can be
divided into two categories:

first, that D.O.T. was negligent

in selecting the 1st East crossing as opposed to other alternatives; second, once the crossing was selected D.O.T. was
negligent in not requiring additional warning devices at the
crossing.

These two contentions will now be discussed.

-7-

A.

There Was No St..bstanlldl l'\'1dc11cr,
That o.o.T. was NeC)Tl(icrit-rr:,-tTie
Selection of the 1st Fast Crossina
as a Detour Route.

A re\'iew of the evidence shnl<':O
great deal of time an cl

ef

tort

l 1r

t

t lie

hzit f'laillt i ff '"f'"'it
lowr•r c()urt

the advantages and disadvant u'lc".s of lhe l st East
railroad crossings.

In aclditioll,

c<•r•:

'".

cl

ci 111,

ls t

v;,

Plaintiff continuously

referred to the traffic patterns and signals utilized on
Carbon Avenue in comparing it to both alternatives.

If

Plaintiff could have shown that the selection of the 1st
East crossing breached a duty of D.O.T. to the motoring public
then such an effort could be justified.

However,

the evidence

is virtually undisputed that the 1st East crossing which was
selected by D.O.T. was a sound and prudent decision in the
discretionarly judgment of D.O.T.
Because Plaintiff did not become involved in an accident
on his route to the railroad crossing, the selection of the
various roads which were utilized in reaching the crossing is
immaterial to this lawsuit.

For example, the claims of Plain-

tiff that additional turns or unsafe turns were required have
no relevance in this litigation.

The only possible relevance

as to the detour route concerns the crossing itself.

In other

words, was the lower court justified in concluding that D.O.T.
exercised reasonable care "in the choice of the detour route
to 1st East."

(Conclusion of Law No.

4).

The evidence clearly shows that D.O.T. was justified in
selecting the 1st East detour route while the Carbon Avenue
-8-

crossinq remained closed.

During the meeting in which D.O.T.

representatives met with the Railroad and City representatives,
the various options for rerouting were thoroughly discussed.
Ll.llc· it

is true as Plaintiff argues in his brief that the 1st

West crossing had certain advantages over the 1st East crossing,
it is equally true that there were advantages of the 1st East
crossing over the 1st West crossing.

As noted by the lower

court in the Findings of Fact, these included the amount of
traffic,

the housing and population of children, the average

speed of traffic, the number of turns that had to be made, the
condition of the crossings, and the convenience of the detour
to the general public.

(Tr. 225-233, 533).

There was no showing by Plaintiff that it was negligent
for D.O.T. to expect cars or trucks to be able to safely pass
across the 1st East intersection.

This was not an instance

where a vehicle was directed on a detour which was negligently
designed and which caused the accident to occur.
v. Utah State Road Comm., 465 P.2d 534

C.f. Bramel

(Utah 1970).

All of the

roads used in the detour were already existing as was the
railroad crossing itself.

Here, the only purpose of the detour

was to route traffic from one existing railroad crossing to
another existing railroad crossing.

There is no showing what-

soever that the decision was either negligent or that such
decision proximately caused Plaintiff's injuries.
Plaintiff argues that because the traffic flow at the 1st
Fast crossing increased from approximately 230 vehicles per day
to over 11,000 vehicles per day then D.O.T. was somehow negli-9-

gent in choosing this particular crossing.
is without merit.

Such aro

aryl•!l'C:it

Plaintiff produced no evidence that the l•·

East crossing was inrar·able of hi.indlinci U.is additional
of vehicles for a short three to five day period.

C1L\'

Jc.,,

l r Ll.:_

thousands of cars and vehicles had utilized the 1st East
crossing for many years prior to the temporary closure of tht
Carbon Avenue crossing.

Thus, while the increased number of

cars may have caused congestion or some other traffic flow
effect upon the crossino,

Plaintiff produced no evidence

that the crossing was made dangerous because of these
cars.

If anything, the fact that this number of cars was atlE

to utilize the crossing during the detour period again showed
that the decision to utilize the crossing was not negligent.
More importantly, however, is the fact that the number c'.
cars which utilized the crossing is completely irrelevant to
this lawsuit.

It is undisputed that at the time of the acci-

dent there was no other traffic traveling in the railroad
crossing.
30).

Plaintiff himself admitted to this fact.

(Tr. 529-

Whether there were 11,000, 100,000 or ten cars passing

in the intersection that day is completely irrelevant to
the facts of this accident in which only the plaintiff and
the train were involved.
The focus of Plaintiff upon the Carbon Avenue crossing

is completely misplaced.

The only factual relevance of the

Carbon Avenue crossing is that Plaintiff would not have crosse:
at 1st East had the Carbon Avenue crossing not been closed.
However, this fact is no more relevant than to say that had
-10-

the pla1nt1ff eaten his lunch five minutes slower he would not
have been at the crossing when the train passed.
tile

Thus, as to

choice of the 1st East crossing itself there is no evi-

riE'rice of neyl1LJence or proximate causation to Plaintiff's
inJuries.
A case involving similar claims is High v. The State Highway Dept.,

307 A.2d 799

(Del. 1973).

In that case the plaintiff's

decedent was traveling on a detour which had been routed by the
state highway department because of construction on the main
highway.

A jury verdict was entered in favor of the plaintiff

and against the highway department for improperly detouring the
traffic.
The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the evidence and
concluded that judgment, as a matter of law, should be entered
in favor of the highway department. The court noted that the
traffic routing plan was prepared in accordance with the usual
and normal provisions used by the highway department.

The

plaintiff, while acknowledging that normal procedures were
undertaken, urged that additional steps should have been implemented including the placement of guardrails, the erection of
more signs, and the construction of a swing-around area.
The court found that the highway department had correctly
exercised its discretion in selecting the traffic routing plan
that was utilized in this case.

The Supreme Court of Delaware

stated:
We think it is clear that if there are two
acceptable courses of action for the achievement
of the same purpose, it is not negligence on the
-11-

part of a defendant to rurscl(' r•11l 1 ,1 t 11( i t ha11 t !1(
other.
This Court rcc·t."Jrcized th l c, I J l: IC 1 I l L' l ),
1 '
I I '( I
1 q f' 1 I
DeFilippo v. Pre"tun, 17' /\ ',)
This was a rnPdil·dJ :-·-111 ),11 + 11
.!l
j ""''(
lit ld
'1
I
Ii
''.II
that t11,• d1•c l •
1

two acC'l"T

i P\j

:_..;til

made tl»c Las''

oi-,erat1on ·....'o.s
We

r·h

I

t

I I

211

(

c..,:,r.1d

!

th1r1K,

t

,1

tt11t

t

Lt

11,,t

: : l']t

ii

u11:-- 1 )(-,

JI./ (

j

If

I

t !,r

('j;

t•iL· } la1rit1ff
1

failed to n,akL' a
issu» of ne,Jligence for the J uri c:;1r1d t [ia l , cc1nSt'(Iucntly,
on this ['hase of th<, cast• t),,. direction of a
verdict for th<' defendant was f.'ro1,er.
To the same E'ffect 1s Goston CC and New York
Canal Co. v. Seaboard
Co., 270 F.
525 (1st Cir. 19211.
We think, therefore, that it
was error to refuse the highway department's motion
for directed verdict.
We point out that this conclusion is not based upon any concept of the doctrine
of sovereign immunit·,,, which is specifically waived
by 18 Del. C. §6509.
This conclusion is based solelv
upon our opinion that no issue of negligence was
presented to be resolved b) the jury as to the highwai'
department.
The judgment against the state highway
department will therefore be reversed.
Id. at 850.
(Emphasis added).
In the instant case the lower court did not rule as a
matter of law that D.O.T. had no liability.

Ra the r,

the court

found as a trier of fact that the detour plan was reasonable
and that D.O.T. exercised reasonable care in the choice of the
detour route.

There is no substantial evidence to the contrar

and therefore the decision of the lower court as to this phase
of its opinion must be sustained.
B.

There was no Substantial Evidence That
D.0.T. was Negligent in the Utilization
of Warnino Devices at the Crossing.

A closely related claim to the one I''reviously discussc,,I
is whether, after choosinq the !st Cast crossinq as the de•,
route,

D.O.T. was obl1qated to make additional warn1nq dev1cec
-12-

In other words, even it
assumed that IJ.<>.T. was not negligent in selecting the
1 l'ct

:c

1

·re>ss1nc1

t• ']urr l " ' I

.:is

an

alternate route was it negligent in

ciddit1onal warning devices during the time the

dPtour was in effect?
Arpellant asserts that because the Carbon Avenue crossing
utilized flashing lights and because improvements in the
crossing with additional lights were being made that this
required some type of signals to be installed on 1st East during
the detour.

(Appellant's Brief, p.

3, 11, 13-14).

In addition,

Plaintiff claims that to be a safe railroad crossing the 1st
East intersection should have allowed traffic to pass at 30
mph.

(Appellant's Brief, p.

20).

The comparison of the Carbon Avenue crossing to the 1st
East crossing is inappropriate.

The Carbon Avenue crossing was

designed to carry a large load of traffic.
Appellant himself,
cars a day.

As noted by

the crossing carried an average of 11,000

The purpose of the intersection and its warning

systems was to allow a speedy flow of traffic across the railroad
tracks except when trains were present.

Thus, the 30 mph

speed which was desirable for providing stability for transversing traffic

(Tr. 167)

railroad crossing.

(Tr.

is only applicable to an "improved"
216).

The purpose of the alternating

electronic signals is to stop traffic only when trains are
coming and to therPforc allow the smooth flow of traffic when
trains are not present.
on the other hand, the 1st East railroad crossing is similar

-13-

to thousands within thl
This

'--·

1

·. l

!\1:.•"

t

J

,,

'·

It

1:

is a low drns1t

Rathe1,

ll,c_-

motorist

ii

I'

to r-ruJc-:

I

t

j

j

l )I

d

1

I

J:

the train to
argument ad\'ariced

"""- 1 LlJ,J,

imposition of

s1,'na1s

the State of l-tah

lt

iri

effect,

require th1

intersection witL1'

of the nurlber of vehicles whu·!
Such a sugacstion is both

may use it in any oiven

illogical and comr_letEcl" unc1ttciinaulc unless millions of
in additional sianal enu1rment is appropriated for such use.
It is clear that Utah law permits these type of intersections on the assumrtior, that a motorist, once he is warnt".:
that a railroad crossing exists,

will exercise the type of ca:

necessary to avoid an accident in conjunction with the same
care utilized by railroad personnel.
D.0.T. was not negligent
crossing for

L:.C.A.

in selecting the 1st East rail!

the detour since its terrain and warning signs

were more than adeqJate
crossing had full
crossing.

§41-6-95,

(Tr.

for observation of trains.

visibilit; of all

2 ll ! .

There

WAS

The

four quadrants of the

very little elevation

difference in the tracks thereu; allowing full
in all directons.

(Tr.

233).

(Sep photogra!Jh contained in

Appendix herein).
In addit1cn,

thPrP well· acl·jUatc- 1-1arr111:.1 sians that

railroad tracks were pre>oe11t
-14-

t_!:··

l'11ur to the tracks on the

1 a\'rmcnt

there were 12-inch wide cross-type or crosses with

,·;mJ ol

"RP".

(Tr.

In addition there were "cross-

the existence of the railroad tracks

'," '-''r,icr,

'"'

231).

,, vertical circular sign with the RR symbol.

D.1 .T.
1

(Tr. 231).

felt that because of these warnings and because of the

terrain of the crossing that additional warning devices would
not be necessary.

(Tr.

201).

There can be no question from the record that the plaintiff
was aware of the existence of the railroad tracks before he
entered the crossing.

The evidence is undisputed that he was

completely familiar with the railroad tracks at the time of the
accident.

Plaintiff had traveled across these same tracks at

the Carbon Avenue crossing for over six years and admitted that
he knew trains generally used the northernmost track.

(Tr. 511)

He also admitted that he knew he was traveling over railroad
tracks at the time of the accident and, in fact, had traveled
over four sets of tracks before he was hit by the train on the
fifth set.

(Tr.

523).

As to Plaintiff's claim that he should have been warned
about the approach of the train, it is not the obligation of the
D.O.T. in this type of intersection to give such a warning.
Rather,

it is the sole responsibility of the motorist and the

train personnel to insure that they are both watching for each
other's presence.

Had this been a case in which a flashing

signal was present but failed to activate when a train approached
then Plaintiff would Justifiably have a claim against D.O.T. if
1t

had the duty to maintain the device.
-15-

Had Plaintiff shown that

the accident was caused b'/ thr

111f't f·,-1

(

tr

11

-i

1 fir

tlt' r(',
j

traffic.

!:I

T'hus,

I

.'.

to place a mechanic::i1

c_' ( '

flt' TL

(If

Wd c

,-j JI'

r l t

de''

crossino in the state·

!

t

rit

l •

Plain ti ff has si."'"'

1' t

f 1

ir

,3

VJhilc·

f t0 1m'-:in

ut

L,'.'E:ry

railru21,

Ln-c n•.3uires a motorist t

stop for an electrical or mechanical signal device or for a
human flagman,

it alsu re<ic11rPs a m0torist to stop when a

railroad train emits an audible signal or when an approachi:
train is visible and is in a hazardous proximity to the
crossing.

§41-6-95,

·.c.A.

The facts giving rise to this accident do not really
concern defendant D.0.T.

in that it merely routed the traffic

to a perfectly usable railroad crossing in which adequate
notice of the crossino was given.

Whether Plaintiff was neoL·

gent in failing to observe the train or whether the train per•
were negligent in failing to adequately warn the plaintiff or
failing to observe him does not concern the liability of
the 0.0.T.
Unlike the plaintiff in High,

supra, Appellant produced

no expert testimony that either the crossing was extra hazad:
or required additional warning devices.
if such testimony had been rresented,

As noted earlier, e\''

the trial court is stil.

able to rule as a matter of law in the tavor of the detour
planning agency.

Here,

there was no evidence of any breach

by D.O.T. in relying on the warnings in existence and upon t•
-16-

111 1!i

vis 1bil i t1· of the crossing itself.
Thus,
1,,,.cJ

the lower court correctly concluded that the D.0.T.
rc-asc>ncJ),]1_'

•111, d ,11,cl

ut

care in the choice of crossing protections

iristal led at the first East crossing.

I.aw !Jo. 4).

(Conclusion

It also concluded that the crossing was not

extra hazardous because of volume of traffic, the nature of
the crossing, the presence of obstructions, or because of other
circumstances prevailing on the night of the accident.

The

court also correctly found that neither the D.O.T. nor the
Railroad had a duty to place flagmen or additional warnings
or protection at the 1st East crossing under the circumstances
of Plaintiff's accident.

(Conclusion of Law No. 5).

These conclusions are based upon substantial evidence.
Even if it is assumed arguendo that D.O.T. had some legal
responsibility for the events occurring within the railroad
crossing itself the evidence is clear that Plaintiff's conduct
was the cause of the accident.

The undisputed facts as to the

warnings given by the Railroad as verified by two disinterested
witnesses and the series of photographs showing the visibility
of the railroad tracks during the 10 to 15 seconds which Plaintiff
had available to observe, clearly supports the lower court's
findings that Plaintiff's actions were the sole proximate cause
of the accident.

(See photographs depicting time sequence of

Plaintiff's approach to the mainline track contained in the
1'.;-r,cndix herein).
Substantial evidence exists to support the lower court's
findings and conclusions.

Regardless of what theory is utilized
-1 7-

by Plaintiff.

the evidence s1rn1 l·,

cl1·1

r:(

1

t

:--, llf ·f

1 rt

t' 1.11.,

d

that D.O.T. was negligent in the "ar111n; to l'la1nt iff c,f

t I"

crossing or in the warning to Pla1nt1tf of the aµprouch111'1
train.

As suer,

t !1<

lr,r

favor shoulcl be'"'

l,>'v.'< l

('('1Ur

t

1 Jl

[ 1

t,11i1CG.

Fe' t :n

l T,

D.O.T. h'f,S IMMl:c,i_ FP0,,1 SL'IT BY PLAINTIFF
UNDER THE GC'rVERNMF.tn'!d lMMIJ"ITY ACT.
While the issue of governmental immunity was never
by the lower court,

respondent D.O.T. would assert that the

decision to utilize the 1st East crossing was clearly a discrctionary function and therefore D.O.T. is immune, as a matter
of law,

from any liabilit; in selecting that crossing.

Section 63-30-10(1),

U.C.A. provides that immunity shall

not be waived if the negligent act or omission arises out of
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion
is abused.

In the recent case of Little v. Utah State Divisicc

of Family Services,

667 P.2d 49

(Utah 1983)

this Court delirlea--

the requirements of a discretionary vs. a ministerial functioc
This Court stated,

"If the state posits immunity on such an

exercise of discretion,

it must make a showing that a

balancing of risks and advantages took place."

Id. at 51.

Here, the April 6, 1979 meeting held by the D.O.T. was a clear
illustration of how a balancing of risks and advantages
In addition,

this Court noted four other preliminary

which must be answered.

Again,
-18-

all four are applicable in tt

CdS('.

First, the decision of D.O.T. as to the improvement of

tl1c,

Carbon Avenue intersection and the route to be used during

ttJt'

detour involved a basic program of upgrading railroad

l'''' 1sect1ons throucihtout the state.

(Tr. 162-167).

Secofld, the improvement work on the Carbon Avenue crossing
and the requirement of rerouting the traffic was essential to
the realization of the upgrading program.

(Tr. 166-167).

Third, the action of evaluating which crossings to upgrade
and the detour routes to be utilized during the upgrading
required the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment,
and expertise on the part of D.O.T.

(Tr. 187-191, 208-218).

Finally, D.O.T. was clearly possessed with the statutory
authority to make the required upgrading of the intersection
and to reroute the traffic during the upgrading.

§54-4-15,

et seq. U.C.A.; §27-12-110, U.C.A.
The decision to perform work on the Carbon Avenue crossing
and the concurrent decision to route the traffic during the
construction period through 1st East was clearly a discretionary
function on the part of the D.O.T.

This was not a one-to-one

dealing between the department and the plaintiff.

Rather, the

decision as to the highway improvement and routing had an impact
"on large numbers of people in a myriad of unforeseeable ways."
And as such, the D.O.T. is protected "from individual and class
legal actions, the continual threat of which would make public
administration all but impossible."
517,

Frank v. State, 613 P.2d

520(Utah1980).
In the alternative, therefore, D.O.T., as a matter of law,
-19-

is immune from an\'

rict
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l 1

tiff regarding
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IS IMPROPER.

The final

/\LI

I

point urJed b

1

JT:-;

l

JCE'.J 1_'r_:

1 1
,
;;

is that this Court

should grant a new trial on the basis that the decision
the lower court was against the weight of the evidence.
(Appellant's Brief, p.

14-19).

In support Plaintiff relies

upon a decision of the Surreme Court of Maine

(Maise v.

407 A.2d 310), a decision of the Florida Appellate Court
(Kinsey v. Kell\',

312 So. 2d 461)

Court of Kisconsin
68) •

and a decision of the Surre'."•f

(Lawver v. City of Park Falls,

151 N.W.2d

This argument and these authorities are not relevant

to this case.
There are many standards of appellate review throughout
the United States.

While some appellate courts consider the

"weight of the evidence'' in reviewing a verdict or findinos
of a lower court,

this Court and the Constitution of Utah

prohibit such review.
649 P.2d 42

In Christiansen v. Utah Transit

(Utah 1982) an action was brought by the olainti'f

against the defendant Utah Transit Authority seeking damane'
for personal injuries. A Jury returned a verdict of 70% of
negligence for the plaintiff and 30% for the defendant.
plaintiff appealed.

This Court affirmed the Jury verdict and

rejected the same argument now being made by Appellant in the
-20-

This Court stated:
Chr1•tiansen contends that the verdict is
:trary to the clear weight of the evidence.
Our scor,e of review in a law case does not permit
us to determine that question.
The Constitution
of Utah, Art. VIII, §9 limits our review in cases
at law to questions of law and thus we will not
disturb a jury verdict on a factual question
which is supported by any competent evidence.
Uintah Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co.,
546 P. 2d 855 (Utah 1976); Nelson v. Peterson,
542 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975); Weber Basin Water
Conservancy District v. Skeen, 328 P.2d 730
(Utah 1959). !i..:_ at 45.
c(1

The scope of review in this case is whether there is
substantial evidence in the record to support the findings
and conclusions of the lower court.

On appeal, this Court

must consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the
trial court's findings of fact and those findings are entitled
to presumption of correctness and may not be overturned so
long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the
record.

Reimchiissel v. Russell, 649 P.2d 26 (Utah 1982);

Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981); Piacitelli v.
Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981)
Even the Federal Circuit case cited by Appellant (Scovill
v. Missouri, 458 F.2d 639) held that a question for the jury
existed as to the negligence of both the plaintiff motorist
and the railroad.

While in Scovill the finder of fact con-

eluded that the conditions were such that the plaintiff was
not properly warned by the railroad and could not observe the
train coming, the principle is still the same that the trier of
fact decided the circumstances based upon all of the evidence.
Here, the trier of fact found to the contrary but still con-21-

sidered all of the evidence reldtlrJlJ t(

parties.

As

such,

a

new t r1a 1 1 s

no substantial evidence lUOCt
Finally,
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to prevail in any a1l}urnent
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there was r10 sulJs' '"''

evidence that Plaintiff was at least
of the accident.

1

negligent at the
Lven assuming arguend::i

that the plaintiff was not the sole proximate cause of the
accident it would still be Plaintiff's burden to prove that he
was less than 50% at fault.

D.O.T.

submits that this conclusic

cannot be reached by any review of the evidence utilizing any
standard.
Quite clearly, Plaintiff failed to make any effort to
observe or hear sights and sounds which were seen and heard by
others including disinterested witnesses.

Since the Railroad

performed all of the statutory requirements of warning there
can be no doubt that Plaintiff was at least 50% negligent in
failing to observe and heed these warnings regardless of any
conduct or misconduct on the part of the defendants.
For these reasons, therefore,

the trial court did not err

in its findings nor is there any justification to remand this
case for new trial.
CONCLUSION
While Plaintiff has presented an interesting case on
involving numerous alleged issues, a breakdown of the
-2 2-

ilJ"l't'

issues shows that there is no valid argument made by Plaintiff.
Fur example,

the facts surrounding the 1st West crossing and

tt." \.irhon !wc·nuc crossing have no materiality to this appeal
what

SUE''.'L·r.

Why Pla1nt1f f
importance.

reached the 1st East crossing is of no

The traf f1c history of the crossing on that day

is of no importance.

The only question of relevance is whether

D.O.T. breached any duty to Plaintiff at the exact moment that
the crossing was attempted.
There is substantial evidence supporting the lower court's
conclusion that no such duty was breached--neither in initially
selecting the detour route or in the warnings that were present.
In any event, D.O.T.

is immune from prosecution because of the

discretionary role this activity invoked.
The decision of the court is fully justified by the evidence.
The decision should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
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Lxl11b1 t D-52 view of plaintiff 13. 2' from mainline rail
3 C,c·corids before accident. (Truck = locomotive)

I.

Cxh;c.c D-50

v;ew

of

seconds before accident.

(Truck

f
Exhibit D-44 view of plaintiff 66' feet from mainline rail and
seconds before accident.
(Truck = locomotive)
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. 11" I 11-cJc v1c·VJ uf 11la1ntiff 110' from mainline rail and
r11....1
lJ1 fut-c' dcc1dL>r1t.
(Truck = locomotive)
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